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WAITING AS RESISTANCE:
LINGERING, LOAFING, AND WHILING AWAY
Harold Schweizer
Der Blick, der ans eine Schöne sich verliert, ist ein sabbatischer.
Er rettet am Gegenstand etwas von der Ruhe seines Schöpfungstages.
Theodor W. Adorno
I. Waiting and Whiling Away
Inoneofhisaphorisms inhisMinimaMoralia,TheodorAdornothinksof
waiting not only as resistance against the avidity of the gaze and the greed
of impatience, but also as a temporality bywhich justice canbe done to the
particular. In the temporality of waiting (Tempo […] des Verweilens) the
object (Gegenstand) emerges from its hiddenness among the obliterating
mass of the general (Adorno1982, 94). If thewaiterwere to linger, loaf, tar-
ry, dwell – if her gaze assumed the quiet stillness that Adorno coins the
Sabbathgaze– shewoulddo justice toa singular object thatwould thereby
come to light. If this coming to light is implied in theLatinword ex-sistere,
to standout, then in theSabbathgaze the singular object comes tobe. Sim-
ilar to Adorno, Hans-Georg Gadamer claims that we learn from the work
of art how to linger (verweilen), and that in this lingering the work of art
affords us a glimpse of “what onemight call eternity” (Gadamer 1977, 60).
It is the same eternity that reveals itself in each leaf of grass and on each
page of Walt Whitman’s Leaves of Grass: “I lean and loafe at my ease ob-
serving a spear of summer grass”, Whitman declares in the opening lines,
and later on: “amused, complacent, compassionating, idle, unitary,/[…] I
witness and wait“ (Whitman 1982, 188, 191 f.).
Before we consider this conjunction of a Kantian aesthetic with Amer-
ican Romanticism, let me ask: Are we still speaking of warten when we
speak of verweilen, or of waiting when we speak of leaning, loafing, and
lingering? While the verb to linger or to loaf might not quite capture the
slightly more tranquil, elongated, and audible temporality of verweilen,
the verb to while resembles the German verb more closely, especially in
its explicit temporal qualifier – to while away one’s time – that does
away with time altogether and may well transport us into an eternity of
sorts. Common to both languages is that the two temporalities seem to be
mutually exclusive: she who lingers does not wait; she whowaits does not
linger.TheSabbath is setapart. If so, itmightbebecause lingering,verwei-
len, whiling (away one’s time), is usually thought of as an intentional,
pleasurable activity as we witness and perhaps experience it in the pages
ofLeavesofGrass –whilewaiting is commonly thoughtof andexperienced
as unpleasantly imposed andwholly undesirable. Lingering appears to be
its own end, whilewaiting is ever incompletewithout the attainment of its
object. The confusion between these temporalities is experienced by liter-
ature students who, when assigned the reading of Leaves of Grass, might
find themselves sorelywaiting for it toendwhentheyshould learn to linger
in each of the fifty-two sections.
A book is not awaiting room.We linger in a book; wewait in a train sta-
tion. The sign “no loitering“ affixed to the door of the waiting room at the
bus station literalizes this difference. Everyone can see how we wait in a
train station, at an airport terminal, in a hotel lobby –we pace, we consult
ourwatches,we pick up anothermagazine from the rack,we get up and sit
down, we open another bag of Fritos Corn Chips.How can we distinguish
the economic and psychological aspects of this waiting, from that quite
distinctly other temporality wherein the waiter lingers and loafs and ob-
serves a spear of summer grass? And how can such lingering amount to a
resistance precisely against the culturally constructed binary of waiting
and lingering? How, in other words, can we linger in our waiting?1
II. The Injustice of Waiting
Waiting is generally thought to be unproductive. He who waits wants,
falls short, has not, lacks. The less someone is made to wait, the more he
has and holds, and vice-versa. Waiting is a marker of inferior economic
and social status, which is why Beckett’s Vladimir and Estragon are
tramps not CEOs. Social and economic strata, as wewell know, are deter-
mined, enforced, and ritually performed by strategic impositions of wait-
ing.Foragoodmanyofusnotmuchhas changed in thehundredyears since
Kafka’s parable of the waiter who waits in vain to gain entrance to the
Law. And not much, some of us would say, has changed in the fifty years
since Martin Luther King, Jr. said “one hundred years [has] passed since
emancipation, with no profound effect on [Black people’s] plight“ (King
1991, 523). Today as then, waiting is used as an instrument of class,
race, rank, and gender distinctions; it is attributed, applied, apportioned
to solidify hierarchies and prejudices, and most fundamentally, to signal
1 Hence Robert Frost’s poem entitled “Waiting“ in which the speaker is overtly
lingering (Frost 1969, 14).
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an individual’s or a group’s existential expendability.When theirwaiting,
despite its strategic and administered prolongations, comes to an end,
when the door opens or the line shortens, it is as if the waiter were given
a little of his life back by receiving permission to return, for a time, into
the purgatory of the busy and the harried. But Kafka’s lowly Mann vom
Lande, whowill diewaiting rather than gain entrance to the law, exempli-
fies, as King also put it, thatwaiting for the socially and politicallymargi-
nalized “has almost always meant Never“ (King 1991, 292).
Ironically, our very strategies of resistance against such social and po-
litical determinations are also complicit with them. Since, proverbially,
nobody likes towait, we strenuously try to repress,mask, or deny it by dis-
tractions that are as bad as, or worse than, the waiting itself: the musac
while we are put on hold on the phone; the news or sports channel in the
hotel lobby; the magazines on ice-curling, fly fishing, or prostate surgery
in thewaiting room; the cigarettes; the chips; the chewing gum. If there is a
political dimension to these distractions, then it might be precisely that
they are to distract us from the realization that we are waiting.
III. The Temporality of Things
The very fluidity bywhich themaxim time-is-money rolls off the tongue
and the authoritative compactness of the phrase forbidding any dispute,
instantly erase the thought that time might have any other than exchange
value. It is a time that perforce must be spent, translated, converted into
something other than itself. The metaphor, as metaphor, performs this
translation, its formal density epitomizing the haste and alacrity bywhich
this conversion is tohappen.Theresolute foregroundingof its economics is
to render time itself inconspicuous; time is to appear and to exist only in its
disguises: the wares, the trinkets, the diversions exchanged for it.
Time saved or savored, as we do in lingering by contrast, is time un-
quantified. Or to say the same differently, only where time is not money
can it be experienced as such. Lingering defies the hegemonic imperative
of money-time. It announces the un-measurable, perhaps the immeasura-
ble, time implied in Gadamer’s sense of an eternity. It is the eternity in
which a child is lost in Rainer Maria Rilke’s “Eighth Elegy” and who
has to be “shaken” out of it (Rilke 1989, 193). Although lingering presup-
poses certain economic privileges, I shall argue that lingering as a form of
resistance has applications that cut across socio-economic strata even as
basic economic needs have to be met before such a resistance can be
mounted.
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Thevery time that ispleasurablyexperienced in lingering isunpleasant-
ly experienced in waiting. What is so exasperating, then, about the expe-
rience of waiting, is that in waiting, time itself is annoyingly conspicuous.
This is essentially what constitutes what I have elsewhere called the scan-
dal ofWaiting for Godot, where nothing but time itself is scandalously on
display. Because “it is we who are passing when we say time passes”, as
Henri Bergson tells us (Bergson 2002, 216), the gratuitousness of the wait-
er’s time amounts to a sense of his existential redundancy as well. And
since the waiter is thus subject to inflation and devaluation, he restlessly
seeks to grasp any bargain to stem the steady drain and dribbling away of
his life. He gets up, he paces, he sits down, he looks at his watch, he grabs
anothermagazine from the rack, allwith the characteristically divided at-
tention of thewaiterwho is always on the lookout for a better deal and into
the avidity ofwhose gaze anything – the dust on that lampshade, the head-
line in thepaper, theSandalsvacationadonTV–comeswith thepromiseof
escape from the waiter’s unworthy existence.
For, precisely the thing that is to kill the waiter’s time kills the waiter
himself – at least briefly and in installments. I hold in my coffee cup the
urn of my own ashes. I read in my tablet my own obituary. I glimpse in
the spot of dirt under my fingernail my own insignificance. And yet, to al-
lowoneself abriefdeath in thecathartic substitutionofa thing for theend-
lessly ragged incompletions of time, to allow oneself to be etherized like a
patient ona table (toborrowan image fromT.S.Eliot’s “Prufrock”), that is
the purpose of the newspaper, the computer game, the lightly salted pret-
zel. The banal, fragile, obsolescent triviality of the things the entertain-
ment industry supplies liberates the waiter from the intimacy of his own
narcissistic self-absorption and functions as ametonymy for the forgetta-
ble incident of his own existence – thewaiterwho – “Prufrock” again – has
measured out his life in coffee spoons.
Theconsumptionofobjects is to compensate for thewasteandworthless
time wherein we wait. My sensual, mental, or visual absorption in things
promises a brief, but relatively secluded material refuge from the humil-
iations of waiting. Each thing is to be consumed so that time does not con-
sumeme.Each is a substitute for a time that does not have to be endured. If
my waiting always seems endless, a thing puts an end to this endlessness
and heals the injuries sustained by my waiting – but only briefly, for a
thing’s temporality is the speed of its consumption.
The temporality of things is ideologically constructed and economically
administered.Sincewewant things, and sincewewant themnow, the sup-
plyofuseful thingsas substitutions for theuselessness ofwaiting is tobeas
endless and inexhaustible as the time that the thing replaces. The market
that is infinite, that will never be saturated, must therefore be understood
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not as spatial or geographic but as temporal. And the waiter’s conscious-
ness in this temporal economyhasaparticularpsychology.Shewaitswhen
she consumes things without wanting them. Or vice-versa, she consumes
things without wanting themwhen she waits. The reversibility of the see-
ing and the seen repeats itself compulsively not only in the scopic field but
also in other subject-object relations. For the not-wanting-of-waiting has
now been displaced into the not-knowing-of-consuming. As a result, the
things thatweconsumeunconsciouslywhilewewaitwillbeeminently for-
gettable, and if forgettable then replaceable, and if replaceable then the
demand for such goodswill be insatiable. Imposed and lengthenedperiods
of waiting not only boost the economics of consumption but they also, by
the logicof subject-object reversibility, alienate thewaiter fromherself for
she is subject to the things that consume her asmuch as they are subject to
her consuming.
Thewaiter’s choice of the things she consumeswhile she waits is, as I’m
suggesting, only seemingly deliberate. It is precisely because I think that I
am briefly not subject to the constraints of waiting when I open another
bag of lightly salted pretzels, it is precisely because my autonomy is illu-
sory, that my consumption of things turns out to be capricious, random,
unpredictable, and thus eminently subject to commercial manipulation.
Not only is the waiter’s autonomy in the choices she makes illusory, but
it is also illusory to assume that the particular thing she thinks she con-
sumes is not the general. Indeed, the fastidious particularity of the lightly
salted pretzels only conceals the generic, repeatable, and thus forgettable
quality of each thing that takes its turn to distract the waiter from her en-
duranceof time. In sum,becauseourwaitinghasnoend–until it does –and
because we avoidwaiting at any cost, the consumption of things is uncon-
scious and compulsive, and our appetite for them insatiable.
IV. The Thing and the Work of Art
Even in his own day, Whitman observed a denigration of life in the in-
flated imperatives of “The latest dates, discoveries, inventions, societies,
authors, old and new/My dinner, dress, associates, looks, compliments,
dues/[…] they are not the Me myself” (Whitman 1982, 191). In the realm
of the undifferentiated, administered consumption of fashions, knick-
knacks, and novelties, I am not myself. I am – to mention only some of
the deaths that I can die – forgettable, obsolete, reproducible like the
things that consume me. But if our escape from time lasts only briefly
and intermittently in the cluttered pages of People magazine, and we
will everhave todie anotherdeath inanother thing, the inexhaustible sup-
ply of similar anesthesia is meant to assure us that we need not wake up.
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What then is the difference between an anesthetic and an aesthetic, a
bag of potato chips and a spear of summer grass? Or, to ask a related ques-
tion, how can Whitman’s mere spear of summer grass redeem the waiter
from his alienated existence as a thing among things? If the usual encoun-
ter with an object elicits the immediate question of its consumption, then
evidently such a question does not apply to a spear of summer grass. The
spear of summer grass appears right at the beginning of “Song of Myself”
as an emblem seemingly of the insignificant, worthless, forgettable thing.
AndwhenWhitman invitesusa little lateron, “Loafewithmeonthegrass”
(Ibid., 192), which is also an invitation to loaf with him in his book, we are
perhaps toassume that suchan invitationmightnotonlybeunconvention-
al, but even a tad unseemly. For “Not words, not music or rhyme I want”,
Whitman insists, “not custom or lecture, not even the best/only the lull I
like” (Ibid.). In its smallness and insignificance, the spear of summer grass
presents itself only to one who against all precepts of etiquette and indus-
try lulls and lingers and loafs.
Thespeciesofgrass isageneral concept. In thegeneral concept thesingle
spear of grass disappears. For the general, as Adorno points out, implies
comparability, exchangeability, substitution. These are economic terms,
implying trade, barter, haggling, dealing, and dickering, all of which sug-
gest, were we to submit the spear of summer grass to such terms, its den-
igration. In the general, to put this simply, the particular is erased. In the
termsof thegeneral,what is thevalueofa spearof summergrass?Whatcan
I get for it? Nothing. It is Whitman’s purpose, of course, precisely to make
economicpropositions ludicrous.Aspearof summergrasshasnovaluebe-
cause theonlyvalue, ina time-is-moneyeconomy, is exchangevalue.When
Kafka cautions, “let someone attempt to seize a blade of grass” (Kafka
1948, 12) and which Deleuze and Guattari paraphrase as “It’s not easy
to see the grass in things” (Deleuze/Guattari 2004, 25), we are reminded
that it is easier to seize a thing that has a certain monetary value, than a
worthless spear of summer grass.
Nobodywants a spearof summergrass. It is tobe relegated to the species
of grass. Once absorbed in the general, its singularity erased, its particu-
larity anonymous, it canbe trampledon.Consider the endless analogues of
such erasure of the singular in the general and the ethical implications of
this erasure:What is a chicken? It is to be relegated to the species of fowl. It
is therefore to be tortured and eaten.What is a cow? It is to be relegated to
the species of bovine. It is a steak and a handbag. And if we are good econ-
omistswho likeourchickenandbeefweshouldpolitelydeclineWhitman’s
invitation to lean and loaf with him.
And yet, if we turn the pages ofLeaves ofGrass, if we read each line as if
itwere a spear of summergrass andeachpage as if itwere theLord’s hand-
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kerchief (Whitman 1982, 193), if, in other words, we do not decline Whit-
man’s invitation, and we find ourselves accepting his wager at the begin-
ning of “Song ofMyself” – “what I assume you shall assume” (Ibid., 188) –
then we are compromised, inconsistent materialists. We are already lean-
ing towards loafing. Adorno suggests a temporal paradigm by which we
inhabit simultaneously andnotwithout vexationbothmaterialist and ide-
alist, both economicandaesthetic ideologies.Adorno is enoughof anecon-
omist himself to understand that attention to a singular constitutes an in-
justice to the general; that eventually theremust be a transfer of attention,
a “Weise desÜbergangs” (Adorno 1982, 94), from theparticular to the gen-
eral, fromthesingular to thesocial, if only soas toconceptualize, contextu-
alize, situate, and communicate theparticular, towhich thereby, however,
wewouldhavecommitted the injustice of generalizationandstereotyping.
The truth that reveals itself inbeholding the spear of summergrass, to par-
aphrase Adorno, constitutes an injustice towards the general, butwithout
committing this injustice, no singular thing will reveal itself (cf.
ibid., 94 f.).
WhatAdorno the aesthete therefore proposes is that rendering justice to
the singular is a matter of “Tempo der Geduld und Ausdauer des Verwei-
lens” (Ibid., 94), a matter of speed, of patience and endurance of lingering
before the singular is eventually erased in the general concept. Adorno
names the abuse of the “Weise des Übergangs” by which such processes
of erasure are performed as “Gedanken als Gewalt”, thinking as violence
and“AbkürzendesWegs” (Ibid.), shortcutof theprocess.Tobeholdaspear
of summer grass or to read a poem, then, is a function of slowness, of slow-
ness of lingering – such as is necessitated by the undulating rhythms of
Whitman’s lines, for example. Such lingering is prompted, likewise, by
the ceremonious formality of a sonnet, or the fragile, fleeting gesture of
a flower, or the nuanced forms and colors of a painting – about which, in-
cidentally, Jacques Lacan says that it requires a “taming”, “civilizing”,
and “seducing” of the eyes’ “voracity” (Lacan 1973, 115, my translation).2
But it is also implied that this temporality of lingering is finite, that al-
though our aesthetic obligations on the Sabbath day are resolutely to be
kept, the Sabbath day will pass, and our eyes will have to turn from the
particular to the general.
2 See Jacques Lacan, Les quatres concepts fondamenteaux de la psychoanalyse
where the French reads: “[…] le ressort apaisant, civilisateur et charmeur, de la
fonction du tableau“ (1974, 115).
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V. The Fetish and the Gaze
If haste is oneway, the fetish is another to subvert the slowness bywhich
the beautiful comes about. The temporalities of haste and of the fetish are
diametrically opposed. Haste is restless speed; the fetish is unvarying
changelessness, annulment of time. Slowness, then, is the fragile velocity
between the economically administered haste and the psychologically
regulated fetish. Like haste, which only accelerates the entropic flow of
time in its illusory displacements, the work of art as fetish serves as talis-
man against the fear of death.
When the child in Whitman’s poem asks, “What is the grass?” the an-
swer, among the many answers Whitman attempts to give in a catalogue
of repeated guesses and maybes, is that it is eminently a thing of time. It
emerges as “the produced babe of the vegetation” and eventually trans-
forms into “the beautiful uncut hair of graves”. Thereafter Whitman’s
thought trails off morbidly to “the hints about dead youngmen andwom-
en” (Whitman 1982, 192 f.) before it soon recovers in his consolatory real-
ization that in the repetitionof this entropic cycle“there is reallynodeath”
(Ibid., 194).
Whitman’s notion of immortality, like Adorno’s metaphor of the Sab-
bath gaze, could easily be misunderstood as a Romantic cancellation of
this universal law of entropy. In the cancellation of the law of entropy
time does not flow from a lower to a higher entropy state. On the contrary,
the object has magically returned from the grave to the babe, from its de-
composition to its original composition and appears as if in the stillness of
its day of creation. Gadamer is right to associate such a miracle with the
senseof anannulmentof timealtogetherbywhich theaesthetic experience
associates itself both with so called timeless works of art as well as with
religious iconography. If the annulment of this law of entropywere amat-
ter of the aesthetic object’s exceptional power by which its very composi-
tion could withstand its decomposition, then we would precisely assume
its timelessness, its a-temporality, and glimpse in it a kind of eternity.
Theutopian fantasyof suchaproposition – refuted in the frayedand scruf-
fy heft of Whitman’s work, as much as in the fragile rarity of a spear of
summer grass – turns the aesthetic experience via a repression of time
and human mortality into the canonically fetishized aesthetic object.
One ofWhitman’s promises, thus, to the aspiring loafer is that he “shall
no longer […]/look through the eyes of the dead.” (Ibid., 189), andwhen he
a few pages later ecstatically exclaims, “there is really no death”, his ex-
clamation is prompted neither by theEgyptian pyramids, nor by theMona
Lisa, nor by the bearded and canonized “spectres in books” (Ibid.) but by
“the smallest sprout” (Ibid., 194), discernible to the gaze of all, rabbits and
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loafers alike. InWhitman’s radically democratic aesthetic, therefore, any-
thing can be beautiful: “The smoke of my own breath” (Ibid., 189), “The
scent of these arm-pits” (Ibid., 211). Although anemic by comparison,
Kant’s foremost examples for the beautiful are,more canonically, flowers;
but his list also includes, perhaps with gleeful seditiousness, crustaceans,
designs à la greque, and foliage on wallpaper (Kant 1974, § 16). For the
beautiful is not a fetishized thing, but a taste—or a smoke, or a scent. It
is eminently a temporality. It is not a thing in time; it is a thing of time.
VI. The Tempo of Taste
Raymond Williams points out “that nearly all forms of contemporary
critical theory are theories of consumption. That is to say, they are con-
cerned with understanding an object in such a way that it can profitably
or correctly be consumed” (Williams 1980, 45 f.). Of all theories of con-
sumption, Kant’s denial that anything at all is understood or consumed
in the aesthetic experience, is by such measures the most ascetic. And
yet, the sensuality of Kant’s metaphor of taste (Geschmack) tells us that
a theory of desirelessness is thinkable only as an oxymoron. Ironically,
Kant’s very asceticism eventually transforms into a prodigiously produc-
tive theory of consumption once theNewCritics fetishize theKantian aes-
thetic experience in the well-wrought urn.
Adorno’s theory, too, is a particular version of a theory of consumption.
It proposes that thebeautiful comesabout in theTempoof thegaze.But the
Tempomakes all thedifference.Without thisTempo on loan frommygaze,
the smallest sprout remains either hidden in thegeneral species of grass, or
fetishized in the object that hides my death. If the smallest sprout is gob-
bled up by rabbits, it is subject to what Adorno called “shortcut of the
process”; if it is made into a timeless work of art, its and my temporalities
are therein cancelled.
In the slownessofmygaze the smallest sprout comes into existence –and
its smallness holds amirror tomy self. Just as the object reveals itself inmy
gaze, I am revealed in its gaze. The reversibility of the gaze implies that the
aesthetic experience is a perpetuation of the mirror stage, anticipated in
Lacan’s observation that it is an aesthetic “primordial form” (Lacan
1977, 2) of the child’s reflection that initiates the imaginary identification.
Lacan’shapless child isanovert ifunacknowledgedreiterationof thechild
in Rilke’s “Eighth Elegy”3 whose gaze has been paralyzed in the illusory
form(Gestaltung) ofanobject.As inRilke’s elegiacpoetry, inLacan’s trag-
3 “denn schon das frühe Kind/wendenwir um und zwingens, dass es rückwärts/
Gestaltung sehe, nicht das Offne, das/im Tiergesicht so tief ist. Frei von Tod./Ihn
sehen wir allein“ (Rilke 1989, 192).
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ic theory such imaginary identification ever sends us on to the alienating
destination that we have charted in the fetishized object. On the extreme
end of its reification, the aesthetic experience comes full circle back to the
economy of (expensive) things.
VII. The Stillness of the Gaze
The Sabbath gaze has lost itself in the beautiful. The word “lost” an-
nounces a reflective stillness – the cessation of the avidity of the gaze.
Theword also implies that theSabbath gaze is not premeditated, calculat-
ed, or even intentional. It is because of the innocence, as itwere, of the gaze
that it salvages in the object the stillness (Ruhe) of the day of its creation.
ThewordRuhe, stillness, quiet, rest – likeWhitman’sword “lull” – implies
bothanauditoryquiet and the cessation, or rather, aswehave seen, a slow-
ness, of movement, above all the movement of the sensory apparatus that
wants to consume all things. It is my stillness – for we are the time that
passes –which is the stillness ofverweilen, inwhich thebeautiful canman-
ifest itself.
Like the beautiful, the stillness of the Sabbath is intrinsic. Neither has
economic purpose; their purpose is precisely not to have economic pur-
pose. The invention of the Sabbath – before we used to do our shopping
on the Sabbath – had long been a gesture toward social equality since
all competition rested on that day. Nothing is bartered, wanted, or won
on the Sabbath. “Apart from the pulling and hauling stands what I am”,
writes Whitman (1982, 191). It is the day, for Whitman, on which one
“bends an arm on a impalpable certain rest” (Ibid.); it is the day on which
“the farmer stops by the bars […] on a First-day loafe and looks at the oats
and rye” (Ibid., 200); it is there for observing,waiting on andwitnessing of
that which was “dropt” during the week: “the handkerchief of the Lord”,
for example. The Sabbath gaze that rests on the sudden exquisite partic-
ularity of a single spear of summer grass, or a single poem, is to assure no
more than “that we may see and remark, and say Whose?” (Ibid., 193).
For if the Sabbath is the day par excellence wherein the creator rests,
and in and because of this resting, finds her creation beautiful, then a
mere leaf of grass, a poem about a leaf of grass, indeed any thing – and
we are things too – invites, indeed necessitates, sabbatical readings. The
aesthetic judgment, for Kant as for Adorno or Gadamer, is a judgment at-
tained in a temporality experienced as an unproductive lingering. It is an
experience that in resisting extrinsic appropriation, utility, or objectifica-
tion attains moral and political dimension.
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The difference betweenwaiting and lingering, as between a thing and a
workof art, is established in theTempo ofmydesire.WhileKantdemands,
as I mentioned, that in the aesthetic experience desire be altogether sus-
pended, Adorno suggests that desire be slowed, delayed, curbed, reduced
– all ofwhich is implied in the temporality of lingering.What is common to
bothKant andAdorno is that the stillness and tranquility practiced in the
contemplation of the work of art does not come about through the want of
the consumer of things. It comes about – fortuitously – through the taming,
relaxing, slowing of the avidity of the gaze; it does not come about through
rapacity but through what for example Wordsworth calls “a wise pas-
siveness” (Wordsworth 1988, 130) which is a version of Lacan’s “laying
down of the gaze” (Lacan 1978, 114).
Whitman’s verbs “observe”, “witness”, “wait”, “lull” hold desire in
abeyance, slow it down. He does not voraciously pick and eat the spear
of summer grass; nor does he indifferently disregard it, for dis-regard
wouldbeamatter of the gaze’s restlessness; nordoes the sensuous frivolity
of his loafing resemble the anemic desirelessness of Kant’s aesthetic; nor
does it resemble the economically administered gaze of the consumer of
things; nor does it resemble the deferential piety of the visitor of the mu-
seumwho genuflects before fetishes; nor does it resemble the satisfaction
of the student of poetry whom Whitman ridicules in the rhetorical ques-
tion, “Have you felt so proud to get at the meaning of poems?” (Whitman
1982, 189). In this observing andwitnessing,we donot attend to themean-
ing – that is to say to the mastering – of poems, for that would be to assign
them exchange value. Forwhat ismasteredmust serve.Whitman’s radical
idleness thus transgresses all the institutionalized pedagogic, economic,
and moral imperatives of his day’s protestant work ethic that favored,
as do we, plumbers over poets.4
VIII. The Slowness of Stillness
„But in the rush of everything towaste”,Robert Frost implores thenew-
lyweds inhis sonnet “TheMasterSpeed”, “That youmayhave thepowerof
standing still” (Frost 1969, 300). As an alternative to the “meaning of po-
ems”,Whitman proposes a similar standing still – perhaps in the horizon-
tal –whenhe suggests that the loafer should be seduced rather than indoc-
trinated: “Stop this day and nightwithme and you shall possess the origin
of all poems” (Whitman 1982, 189). The lingerer is seduced; the waiter is
manipulated. Since one would scarcely be able to observe, from afar, the
difference between seduction and manipulation, we are reminded that
4 See Republican presidential candidate Marco Rubio’s claim that “we need
more welders, less philosophers“ (sic.). (The Atlantic Monthly, Nov. 14, 2015).
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waiting and lingering, and especially their differences, are to some degree
invisible. There is a certain intimacy, or even secrecy, that adheres to these
temporalities; this is particularly the case with lingering, that secretly
turns impatience into delight, or even perhaps a thing into a work of art.
The origin of all poems – a version of Adorno’s day of creation – is at-
tained in stopping. Stopping, standing still, leaning, loafing, lingering,
waiting, witnessing, observing, and not to forget “compassionating”, all
perhaps in the same “slightly leaning-forward position” that Lacan as-
signs to the child in the mirror stage (Lacan 2006, 76) – these are the tem-
poralities within which the beautiful – briefly – reveals itself. The brevity
of the appearance of the beautiful is announced in the abruptness of stop-
ping. While stopping initiates lingering, lingering, we might say, is an ex-
tendedstopping.We linger like theboat that floats in thecurrent of the riv-
er that flowspast it at slightly greater speed; and it appears to theperson in
the boat as if she were standing still.
We might thus understand the aesthetic experience within the linear
flow of time as the illusion of standing still, a motionless stillness. This
is the Tempo of Adorno’s Sabbath day. It is tempting to Platonize such a
concept, as I have pointed out, as a fetishized unchanging timelessness,
but that would precisely obscure the fact that stillness is a slowness and
that standing still is a movement, and that the beautiful cannot be had,
kept, and put on a shelf.5 When Whitman leans and loafs and observes a
spear of summer grass, he observes the spear of summer grass in the
same temporality as his own.
Thewaiterwho stops, stopswaitingbecause the trainhas arrived, or she
starts to linger because she observes a spear of summer grass. The lingerer
who stops doesn’t stop lingering. She lingers in a temporality that has
slowed to a seeming stopping. She stands still. She leans slightly forward.
If she were to receive advice from the productively busy and harried, she
would be told that such leaningwill end in her falling behind. But she lin-
gers self-forgetfully; she learns the origin of all poems. She has lost her
gaze in the stillness of its day of creation.
IX. The Illicitness of Stopping
The risk of falling behind, or of falling out of syncwith the busy and the
harried, is the poet’s professional hazard – to whom Herman Melville’s
Bartleby, who famously prefers not to work, should perhaps serve as a
5 When Ralph Waldo Emerson in his poem “Each and All” finds beautiful sea
shells and takes them home with him, he discovers that “the poor, unsightly, noi-
some things/Had left their beauty on the shore“. (Emerson 2001, 432).
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warning.Stopping–of time, of intention, ofpurpose– is the romantic trope
par excellence. We find it in Wordsworth and Whitman alike. In Words-
worth programmatically in the lines “‘I sit upon the old gray stone,/And
dreammytimeaway’” (Wordsworth1988, 130); or in the lines, “Dullwould
he be of soul who could pass by/a sight so touching […]” (Ibid., 285). The
same imperative to linger, not to pass by, is the origin of “Michael”, where
“youmightpass by,/Might see andnotice not […]” (Ibid., 224 f.,my italics).
In Coleridge’s “The Ancient Mariner”, the mariner stops the wedding
guest and prevents him from going to heaven – often allegorized as a wed-
ding feast in theChristianBible. InMelville’sBartleby, theScrivener, Bar-
tleby’s stoppingofall professional obligations andactivities, andhis even-
tualdeath,presentyetanotherversionof theeconomicandexistentialper-
ils of stopping. Many poems imply that the poet stands still, stops, lingers,
and many poems thus also imply that such stopping and lingering is con-
trary to all economic interest. Unlike a novel, which one reads by waiting
for theendof the sentenceand for theendof thepage, asSartreputs it (Sar-
tre 1949, 41), a poem, I propose, is a stopping.
One of themost famous iterations occurs in Robert Frost’s poem “Stop-
ping byWoods on a Snowy Evening”. “He will not see me stopping here”,
announces the speaker, implying the shy illicitness of his intention to stop
“Between the woods and frozen lake/The darkest evening of the year”
(Frost 1969, 224). The owner of the woods, for whom the woods likely
hold economic interest, might think of such stopping as quaint, unreason-
able, or perhaps evenas trespass. There is, as the long, darknight inFrost’s
poem intimates, something risky about stopping towatch thewoods fill up
withsnow. Itmight take forever.Onemightneverkeepone’spromises.One
might advisedly, as Frost warns in “Desert Places”, defy the Romanic im-
perative anddecide on “going past/[…] lonely as it is” (Ibid., 296). There is,
for different reasons, something risky about stopping this day and night
with Walt Whitman. One might think of it differently the morning after.
In “StoppingbyWoods on aSnowyEvening”, the horse – clearly denigrat-
ed to aworkhorse – rightly “gives his harness bells a shake”butneither the
bells nor the clumsiness of the rhyme, “to ask if there is some mistake”,
awakens the traveler fromhis trance.For there isanother,beautiful, sound
in the woods that evening: “the sweep/Of easy wind and downy flake”
(Ibid., 224), which is the outward manifestation of the traveler’s en-
chantment.
The poem ends with the traveler’s resolute determination to keep his
promises. Frost does not tell us what promises these are, but we can sur-
mise that they have to dowith the fulfillment of ultimate, essential obliga-
tions, perhaps no less than the fulfillment of life itself, since the traveller
emphatically repeats to have “miles to go before I sleep,/And miles to go
before I sleep” (Ibid., 225). The repetition in that final couplet implies
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the arduous labor that it is to fulfill the promise of one’s life. But that is the
promise the travelerhasperhaps, in that longpauseafter “lovely, darkand
deep” (Ibid., 224) found in the silent falling of the snow– thepromise of life
that now enables him to keep his promises.
If they are made out of habit they are not promises. If they are made out
of necessity they are not promises. If they aremade out of duty they are not
promises. If they aremade out of fear they are not promises. Neither habit,
nornecessity,norduty, nor fear compels the traveller to stop.Thepromises
he intends to keep originate from a realm outside of or prior to a contrac-
tual economy. Promises, thus, if they are to have value, might most felic-
itously originate in the authenticity, freedom, and solitude of self-reflec-
tion, in the enchanting stillness of a snowfall, in the vast space of liberty
thatFrost’spoempresents tousasastoppingbywoodsonasnowyevening.
We are not horses.
The horse waits, the traveler lingers. Stopping, pausing, lingering, in-
deed reading, listening, and looking, are essential conditions for aesthetic
andethical insight.Theyareneither simplisticallyuseful, nor immediately
practical, nor always convenient, nor highly regarded by horses. But aes-
thetic andethical insight, theperceptionof thebeautiful andof thegood, is
not granted to onewhodoesnot stop and riskher journey, as thepoemsug-
gests, indeed who does not risk her future.
Surely, the traveller in Frost’s poem had not planned to stop, was not
told, was not asked, indeed did not know she would stop. The beautiful
cannot be ordered, scheduled, planned, or predicted. It happens in that
it happens throughus, ifwewere so inclinedas to lendourselves to its hap-
pening through our “wise passivity” in it. And if it is true that the kind of
stoppingwewitnessandexperience inFrost’spoemleads to theperception
of beauty and that perception to the ability to make free moral choices –
because theperception of beauty is eminently free – then stopping is an ac-
tivity. Even waiting, that most maligned of all temporal experiences, can
beanactivity –butonly if thewaiter lingers in it.Evenwaitingmaypresent
itself as an opportunity to encounter those aspects of life otherwise ob-
scured by haste. We mostly wait in haste.
Frost’s poem asks us to stop in andwith the poem to attend to the origin
of all poems in the sweep of easywind anddowny flake, to hear out ofwhat
intimations the traveller awakens to keep her promises. Waiting is atten-
tion. The ability to wait – lingeringly, patiently – informs the way we are
with other people, especially people who need of us a waiting, as Simone
Weil puts it, that is wholly subservient to nothing but waiting (Weil 2001,
62–65). In suchwaiting,weoppose not only the voracious speedofmodern
life, but also the ordinary expectations according to which waiting is al-
ways supposed to be object-related andnot in itself a valuable experience.
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In waiting with a poem, a painting, or a patient, we find ourselves in the
realm of lingering, in a wholly otherworldly, immeasurable temporality
that immersesus inawaitingwithoutobject or end.We linger in it endless-
ly. We wait without end. Some medical schools thus train their doctors to
learn patience by having them look at paintings, read poems, or perhaps
observe a spear of summer grass. Illness or suffering, or the attention to
the beloved who suffers, are most irrefutably experiences of stopping
and lingering. Medical practitioners would do well to sense a patient’s
deeper temporality and through patience come to apprehend the patient’s
endurance. The instrumental, object-related nature of ordinary waiting
conceals this intimate, existential aspect.
If I stop and wait I may find my promise and therein the power to keep
promises. If I claimmyexperienceofwaitingrather thanbeingmerely sub-
jected to it, if I resist the commercialization of time, if I own my time, if I
stop to watch the woods fill up with snow, I make timematter – and then I
matter. Matter, of course, is just another word for time, and time another
word for being.
X. The Necessity of Lingering
Wemust learn to linger in our waiting. No doubt, this sort of resistance
by which we oppose the time-is-money culture is unspectacular, indeed
literally so in that it is largely invisibly performed in small rooms before
dawn, in sudden clearings in the woods, in languid moments on Tuesday
afternoons. One doesn’t need an app or a degree for it. Like Henry Thor-
eau’s art of sauntering, or Whitman’s loafing, or Wordsworth’s whiling
away his time on a gray stone, or Frost’s stopping on a snowy evening,
the art of lingering opposes economic appropriations.
And yet, evidently lingering, loafing, and whiling away, necessitate a
cabin byWalden Pond, or a horse-drawn sleigh. Kant, too, clearly empha-
sizes that before one can have an aesthetic experience one’s basicmaterial
needs must be met. But the aesthetic experience troped by Adorno as the
stillness of the day of creation, or by Whitman as the origin of all poems,
also implies the priority of the aesthetic over the utilitarian. It is forWhit-
man, as we have noted, the “First-day” onwhich the famer loafs to see his
oats, even as he must have sown them before, even as in our protestant
work ethic one does not deserve to rest without having worked. But it is
evenmore incontestable– ifnonethelesswidelycontested– thatonecannot
workwithout having rested. Thepriority of rest overwork, of the aesthetic
over the utilitarian, is a necessity not just a pious maxim, or a dispensable
luxury. For when the dialectical relationship between the aesthetic and
the utilitarian has been reductively falsified in the self-sufficient monad
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of economic utility, all lives turn out to be nothing but things to be
consumed.
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„Waiting as Resistance: Lingering, Loafing, andWhilingAway” ist eineKritik
der Ökonomie des Konsums. Die Unterbewertung desWartens als verlorene Zeit
und deren ökonomische und psychologische Verdrängung im Konsum von kauf-
baren Dingen, enthüllt sich als Unterbewertung des Lebens selbst. Im Verweilen
und ähnlichen nicht objekt- oder zielorientierten Zeitlichkeiten erleben wir eine
fundamentale Temporalität, die allgemein ist. DasEssay knüpft konzeptionell an
ein kurzes Zitat von Theodor Adorno an und argumentiert mit Hinweisen auf das
dichterischeWerkvonWaltWhitmanundanderenDichtern, immermit demZiel,
gegen die Reifikation der Zeit als Geld und die soziale und ökonomische Reduk-
tion aller Lebenswerte zu opponieren.
Abstract
„Waiting as Resistance: Lingering, Loafing, andWhilingAway” is a critique of
the economics of consumption, suggesting that the widespread denigration of
waiting as lost timeand its economic andpsychological displacements in consum-
er goods amount to a denigration of human life itself. In the practice of lingering
and its related temporalities, the author proposes, we regain an appreciation of
the fundamental temporality of all things, that everything, we humans included,
is constituted by time. Conceptually indebted to Theodor Adorno and substanti-
atedwith reference, chiefly toWaltWhitman’s “Leaves ofGrass” andotherpoetic
works, this argument throughout opposes the reification of time asmoney and the
attendant social and economic demotion of all value to exchange value.
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